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Introduction 
 
“News, if unreported, has no impact,” wrote journalist Gay Talese in his history of the 
New York Times, The Kingdom and the Power. “It might as well have not happened at all. Thus 
the journalist is the important ally of the ambitious, he is a lamplighter for stars.”1 Journalism is 
perhaps the most important ally of the politician; Walter Lippmann, founding editor of The New 
Republic, seemed to think so when in 1922 he wrote, “The news is the chief source of the 
opinion by which government now proceeds.”2 This was certainly true of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s government. President Roosevelt engaged frequently with the press: he held press 
conferences twice a week in the Oval Office and developed a rapport with many reporters, joking 
with them, teasing them, and winning their respect.  However Roosevelt struggled with many 
newspaper publishers. While reporters in the press room were largely friendly towards his 
administration’s policies, their editors and publishers, who were mostly Republican, influenced 
press coverage toward their own political point of view.   
This was actually helpful to the President, to some degree. Roosevelt used the press to 
understand American public opinion, and he used his frequent conferences with the press to try 
to lead that opinion forwards. This is particularly evident in the case of American aid to Great 
Britain at the beginning of World War II. While the U.S. did not officially involve itself in the 
war until attacked at Pearl Harbor in December 1941, it did begin financial and material aid to 
Great Britain in 1940. Roosevelt led the charge for these policies – first through the Destroyers 
for Bases agreement in September 1940 that leant the British 50 U.S. World War I destroyers in 
exchange for leases on British naval bases in the Americas, and then through the Lend-Lease 
Act, a loaning of arms and war material that would not have to be repaid until after the war. But 
                                                
1 Gay Talese, The Kingdom and the Power (New York: The World Publishing Company, 1966), 2. 
2 Walter Lippmann, Liberty and the News. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 6. 
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the majority of the American people, still in favor of isolationism, were not eager to involve their 
country even financially in the foreign war, fearing this would lead to military involvement. As 
Roosevelt endeavored through speeches, Fireside Chats, press conferences, and eventually 
foreign policy to advocate internationalism, the press informed him of public opinion and, in 
doing so, acted as a check on his executive power. 
Coaxing public opinion from isolationism to internationalism was Roosevelt’s task from 
1939 to 1941. Historian R. S. Sayers, one of the authors of the official British history of World 
War II, wrote of this period, “In retrospect the historian may emphasize that American 
participation was sooner or later inevitable […] but a nation of millions of people is not brought 
readily to decisions of this kind.”3 There were many factors that contributed to this change in 
public opinion; this thesis focuses on how these, principally executive power and growing British 
need, played out between the President, and his proxy for public opinion, the press.   
 
The Power of the President 
Roosevelt himself was a dynamic, press-oriented president. He had been president of the 
Harvard Crimson at college, albeit a post of greater social than journalistic distinction at the 
time.4 Taking office in the middle of the Great Depression, he saw himself as a latter-day 
Jefferson defending the rights of the people against a Hamiltonian minority of wealth and 
privilege.5 As he was running the government on behalf of the large and varied American public, 
he wanted to both understand the public’s perception of its needs as well as educate it and lead 
the country forward. While previous executives had avoided reporters, Roosevelt welcomed 
                                                
3 Warren F. Kimball, The Most Unsordid Act: Lend-Lease, 1939-1941  (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969), 
vi. 
4 Alan Brinkley, Franklin Delano Roosevelt. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 5. 
5 Graham J. White, FDR and the Press. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), ix. 
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them into the Oval Office. He did not require the press to submit written questions in advance, as 
had been President Hoover’s practice, and he took the press with him when he went on domestic 
trips.6 To help him in his dealings with the press was Stephen T. Early, himself a reporter before 
Roosevelt hired him as White House Press Secretary. Early served Roosevelt longer than any 
other close aide, from the beginning of the New Deal until the President’s death – a story he 
himself had to break. Early was a recognizable Washington figure who held his own daily press 
conferences.7 These two men, who both combined the attributes of politician, editor, and 
journalist, shaped both public opinion and foreign policy against the backdrop of world political 
events. 
 
The Power of the Press 
The relationship between Roosevelt and the print media has not been studied as often as 
might be expected for a President who had such an involved and intimate relationship with the 
press. The majority of the literature on the relationship between the press and this President is at 
least twenty years old, while most of today’s scholarship focuses on the effect on the presidency 
of digital media, from broadcasting to the Internet. But Roosevelt’s relationship with the print 
media is worthy of in-depth study precisely because there was not a profusion of digital media in 
his day. During the Roosevelt Administration there was no broadcast journalism to speak of and 
the radio of the time did not feature commentary. The only outlet for editorialized journalism 
was newspapers and newsmagazines, which enjoyed a very high readership. From 1920-1935 the 
total circulation of English-language dailies in the country increased from 27 to 41 million, with 
                                                
6 Betty Houchin Winfield, FDR and the News Media. (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1990), 27. 
7 Linda Lotridge Levin, The Making of FDR: The Story of Stephen T. Early, America’s First Modern Press 
Secretary. (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2008), 13.
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an upswing in 1939 after the start of the war in Europe.8 Meanwhile the relatively new 
newsmagazines enjoyed a wide readership as well: the top 20 magazines (both news and other 
interest) of 1940 had a combined circulation of over 44 million.9 When there were so few 
(compared to today) news organizations covering the President, his relationship with them was 
necessarily of much greater importance. 
 This thesis will focus on the coverage of three daily newspapers: the New York Times, the 
Washington Post, and the Chicago Tribune. Each of these papers enjoyed a high national 
readership, and Roosevelt had personal – although not always cordial or supportive – 
relationships with their publishers and reporters. Roosevelt had friendly relations with Adolph 
Ochs and his successor, Arthur Hays Sulzberger, the two publishers of the New York Times 
during Roosevelt’s term in office; he invited Ochs and his wife to stay overnight at the White 
House, and he and Sulzberger met with some regularity following the outbreak of World War 
II.10 Roosevelt occasionally struggled with Times reporters – he tended to mockingly refer to the 
paper’s senior White House correspondent, Arthur Krock, as “Li’l Arthur” in public, and once 
told Turner Catledge, a Washington-based Times reporter junior to Krock, that he should feel 
free to acquire information directly from the President, without having to go through Krock.11 
Still, the Times was largely supportive of Roosevelt, though it did not support his 1940 bid for 
re-election.  
The Washington Post was also largely supportive – though much more so of the 
President’s foreign policies than his domestic.12 Roosevelt called Eugene Meyer, the banker who 
                                                
8 Douglas Waples, “Communications.” The American Journal of Sociology 4 (1942): 910. 
9 Michael G. Carew, The Power to Persuade: FDR, the Newsmagazines, and Going to War, 1939-1941 (New York: 
University Press of America, 2005), 205. 
10 White, FDR and the Press, 60-61. 
11 Talese, The Kingdom, 183, 43. 
12 White, FDR and the Press, 61. 
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had bought the paper, a man from “the counting room rather than the news desk,” but Meyer 
nonetheless offered invaluable assistance to Roosevelt in the realm of foreign affairs. For 
instance, in early March 1941 – before Lend-Lease had been passed – Meyer divulged to 
Roosevelt the results of a series of polls commissioned by the Post indicating that the transfer of 
destroyers to the Allies would be approved by 56 percent of the population and only opposed by 
26 percent and, furthermore, that men of draft age favored the Lend-Lease Bill.13 
 By comparison, Roosevelt had a very contentious relationship with the publisher of the 
Chicago Tribune, Colonel Robert McCormick. The two had gone to school together at Groton 
and while McCormick’s paper did not support Roosevelt’s initial bid for election in 1932, the 
President met with his former schoolmate several times after his election with the hope of 
establishing a working relationship.14 But this did not prove fruitful. The conservative and 
isolationist McCormick disagreed with Roosevelt’s New Deal, particularly the National 
Recovery Administration, as well as his internationalist foreign policies. Roosevelt in turn baited 
McCormick; he gave his 1937 “Quarantine” speech in which he advocated internationalism by 
calling for a need to “quarantine the aggressor nations” in McCormick’s Chicago, mocked the 
Colonel during his press conferences, and directed Stephen Early to keep a scrapbook of Tribune 
clippings that manifested animus toward the New Deal.15 Early filled it quickly enough, as 
McCormick’s paper rarely supported the President. 
 
Historiography 
The existing historiography on the relationship between Roosevelt and the press in this 
period is fairly limited. It comes from two kinds of works: firstly scholarship specifically 
                                                
13 White, FDR and the Press, 61. 
14 Richard Norton Smith, The Colonel (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1997), 319-321. 
15 Smith, The Colonel, 327. 
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devoted to the relationship between the President and the print media over the course of his 
administrations, and secondly scholarship primarily concerned with Roosevelt’s foreign policy. 
The former focuses on the press at the expense of outside concerns, while the latter only 
discusses the press tangentially, if at all. For my research I have mostly relied upon secondary 
source material about Roosevelt’s foreign policy (especially Robert Dallek’s Franklin D. 
Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945 and Warren F. Kimball’s The Most 
Unsordid Act: Lend-Lease, 1939-1941) in conjunction with press conferences, newspaper 
articles, and histories of the newspapers in question to better portray the connection between the 
President and the press in this time.  
This differs significantly from the existing literature specifically devoted to the 
relationship between the President and the press. Graham J. White’s FDR and the Press, the first 
book dedicated to this relationship, focuses on Roosevelt’s attitude towards reporters, editors, 
and publishers, and ultimately concludes that while the President welcomed press opposition at 
times, he was generally indifferent to press support as he enjoyed electoral success regardless.16 
White drew his conclusion from his reading of a wide variety of newspapers, but he did not 
consult Roosevelt’s press conferences or his correspondence with publishers. Betty Houchin 
Winfield did explore these sources, but came to the same conclusion as White in her book, FDR 
and the News Media. Explaining the gap between newspaper support for Roosevelt (the 
President had the endorsement of only 25 percent of the dailies and 33 percent of the weeklies in 
1940) and popular support (the President won 55 percent of the popular vote in 1940), she 
argued that “the opinion pieces and editorial slants of the American press did not have strong 
persuasive powers.”17 
                                                
16 White, FDR and the Press, 153-4. 
17 Winfield, FDR and the News Media, 128. 
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Both these historians fail to understand the true power of the press. Roosevelt would not 
have maintained twice weekly press conferences had he not believed in the persuasive power of 
newspapers and not wanted to be aware of public opinion. Richard W. Steele understood this, 
focusing almost exclusively on the challenge of overcoming isolationism in his Propaganda in 
an Open Society: The Roosevelt Administration and the Media, 1933-1941. Steele’s study 
focused on different types of media, from newspapers to radio to the movies. Precisely because 
of this, his analysis of the relationship between Roosevelt and the print media – the most 
important, given that it was the sole branch that delivered an editorial viewpoint at this time – 
was spotty. While he claimed, “newspapers […] would never quite fulfill FDR’s long-standing 
quest for an objective vehicle of government views,” this misunderstands the unique character of 
newspapers at the time: they were far from objective.18 On the radio the President could speak 
directly, unedited, to the people; in newspapers and magazines his actions were subject to 
interpretation first by a reporter and then his editor and publisher. This is exactly what makes the 
study of the relationship between Roosevelt and the print media so potentially fruitful, not to 
mention interesting. 
Implicit in the existing historiography is the assumption that the relationship between 
Roosevelt and the press went one way – that the President used the press to influence public 
opinion. But my research shows that the relationship was a two-way street. Roosevelt used the 
press as much to learn about public opinion as he did to educate that public opinion.  In doing so 
the President treated the press as a political force in its own right: the fourth estate. He was 
hardly the first to do so; Thomas Carlyle attributed the term “fourth estate” to Edmund Burke, 
who first used it in a 1787 parliamentary debate on the opening up of press reporting in Great 
                                                
18 Richard W. Steele, Propaganda in an Open Society: The Roosevelt Administration and the Media, 1933-1941. 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1985), 98. 
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Britain’s House of Commons.19 But in recognizing the utility of the press, Roosevelt had a much 
more reciprocal understanding of the presidency’s relationship with it than the literature implies. 
My work differs from the existing historiography in both its methodology and its 
conclusions. I look at three national daily newspapers and approach their coverage 
chronologically, but in tandem with the interactions that took place between Roosevelt and 
reporters in press conferences. By recreating the feedback loop between the President and the 
press – from Roosevelt’s press conferences, to their portrayal in the newspapers in question, to 
how the President in turn reacted to these in his subsequent press conferences or public speeches 
– this thesis reveals the effect of both the President on the press and the press on the President, 
underscoring the reciprocal relationship between both political actors. 
                                                
19 Paul Starr, The Creation of the Media: Political Origins of Modern Communications. (New York: Basic Books, 
2004), 45. 
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Chapter 1: June-September 1940 
The lack of major military operations following Nazi Germany’s invasion of Poland in 
September 1939, the so-called ‘phony war,’ led many Americans to believe that the U.S. would 
not have to involve itself – either by giving aid or sending troops – in the European conflict. 
Isolationist sentiment was strong in the country at large and the Nazi threat seemed less serious 
than it had immediately after Great Britain declared war.20 But the events of May 1940 changed 
everything: Germany’s decisive invasion of the Low Countries and France shattered the Phony 
War. Within six weeks, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg, and France had fallen, leaving 
Germany with an uninterrupted path to the English Channel and Great Britain to fight the Axis 
alone. Roosevelt had been eager to aid the Allies since the beginning of the war but feared the 
country would not have been with him.21 According to a Fortune magazine poll in September 
1939, between 50 and 60 percent of the public supported aid to England and France, but the 
majority of this group unequivocally wished to keep the U.S. out of war.22 Roosevelt’s public 
role was thus mostly constrained to monitoring the developments abroad.  
In the wake of the fall of France, American support of sales of air force planes to England 
and France rose to 80 percent, and with such public support Roosevelt started to act behind the 
scenes.23 In response to a request from a friend to step up aid to the Allies and publicly identify 
himself with this aim, he responded triumphantly in a letter of June 7:  
I beat you to it! Very many planes are actually on the way to the Allies […] I am doing everything 
possible – though I am not talking very much about it because a certain element of the Press, like 
                                                
20 Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945 (New York: Oxford University 
Press), 201. 
21 While in his fireside chat two days after Germany’s invasion of Poland Roosevelt promised, “I hope the United 
States will keep out of this war. I believe that it will. And I give you assurance and reassurance that every effort of 
your Government will be directed toward that end,” on September 1, the eve of the invasion, he had asked the 
Commerce Department for a program that would allow Americans to sell “certain types of war supplies to friendly 
nations without violating the [Neutrality] Act.” Dallek, American Foreign Policy, 199. 
22 Dallek, American Foreign Policy, 201. 
23 Dallek, American Foreign Policy, 228. 
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the Scripps Howard papers, would undoubtedly pervert it, attack it, and confuse the public mind. 
This is inadvisable even though I am personally well accustomed to it […] Very soon there will be 
the simple statement you speak of.24  
 
Just three days later Roosevelt got the chance to make this “simple statement.” While the 
President was concerned by the movements of Germany and Japan, he was also trying to ensure 
that Benito Mussolini, the leader of Fascist Italy, kept his country out of the war. On June 10, 
1940, this failed when Italy joined the Axis, declared war, and attacked France. On the same day, 
Roosevelt gave the graduation address to his son Franklin Junior’s class at the University of 
Virginia.25 The speech was altered at the last minute in order to incorporate Italy’s act of war. It 
also included for the first time a promise that the U.S. would act on the internationalist position 
Roosevelt had been trying to convince the American people was necessary at least since his 
“Quarantine” speech of 1937: a policy of collective security, aid to Great Britain, and taking up 
the role of world leader.26 
The President’s speech at the University of Virginia slipped quickly from congratulating 
the young graduates to addressing the troubled world they were about to enter. Arguing against 
the isolationists, Roosevelt maintained that the actions of the last few months had rendered their 
vision of the United States as “a lone island” untenable:  
Such an island may be the dream of those who still talk and vote as isolationists. Such an island 
represents to me and to the overwhelming majority of Americans today a helpless nightmare, the 
helpless nightmare of a people without freedom. Yes, the nightmare of a people lodged in prison, 
handcuffed, hungry and fed through the bars from day to day by the contemptuous, unpitying 
masters of other continents.27  
 
This summary rejection of the isolationist viewpoint was worded much more strongly than 
Roosevelt had ever before allowed himself to speak in public. Bolstered by new figures 
                                                
24 “FDR to Lewis W. Douglas in New York,” June 7 1940 in FDR: His Personal Letters, 1928-1945, Volume II 
(New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1950), 1037-8. 
25 Levin, Making of FDR, 214. 
26 David F. Schmitz, The Triumph of Internationalism: Franklin D. Roosevelt and a World in Crisis, 1933-1941 
(Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2007), 66. 
27 Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address at Charlottesville, Virginia, June 10, 1940. 
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indicating that 80 percent of the public now supported aid to the Allies, Roosevelt was able to 
strengthen both his language and his policy. He continued:  
We will pursue two obvious and simultaneous courses; we will extend to the opponents of force 
the material resources of this nation and, at the same time, we will harness and speed up the use of 
those resources in order that we ourselves in the Americas may have equipment and training equal 
to the task of any emergency and every defense.28  
 
This was a promise of determined action. During the summer of 1940 an extensive and public 
plan for giving aid to the Allies was to be developed, culminating on September 3, 1940, with the 
Destroyers for Bases agreement. But between the declaration of action and the actual agreement, 
Roosevelt and the press went through several difficult news cycles. 
 
Sympathy, If Not Support 
The press had not been expecting any big international news to be announced at a 
graduation address, but Stephen Early, Roosevelt’s press secretary, stayed at the White House 
until midnight the night before to inform the press that Roosevelt would make an important 
announcement on the war the following day. Early then accompanied the President to 
Charlottesville and oversaw the arrangements for the speech at the University to be broadcast 
live on all radio networks.29 The press turned out for the event in full force and their coverage 
was largely positive. The New York Times, the Washington Post, and the Chicago Tribune all 
reprinted the text of Roosevelt’s speech for their readers. Reception at the University of Virginia 
was described as supportive; the Washington Post wrote “When the President said that ‘the 
whole of our sympathies’ lie with the nations that are fighting ‘the gods of force and hate,’ the 
flag-draped gymnasium echoed with wild shouts of approval.”30 The Post’s editorial was 
                                                
28 Roosevelt, Address at Charlottesville. 
29 Levin, Making of FDR, 214. 
30 George Bookman, “President Pledges ‘Full Speed Ahead’ on Material Aid to Allies in Fervent Prayer for Their 
Victory,” Washington Post, June 11, 1940. 
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similarly approving. It took to task those who had disagreed with Roosevelt in the past and 
welcomed the President’s forthright declaration:  
The truth and justice of Mr. Roosevelt’s declaration is so obvious that no voice is likely to be 
heard in contradiction. But the present unanimity of American opinion only emphasizes the 
tragedy of the period, prior to last September, when the President time and again drew much the 
same conclusions and the country failed to recognize its importance.31  
 
The Tribune, the severest critic of the President, featured a surprisingly mild response to 
his Charlottesville speech. While the paper’s front page article did begin by claiming, 
“Isolationists were assailed by Mr. Roosevelt,” it did not write an editorial from the point of view 
of those isolationists; it was much more preoccupied with the military developments in Italy.32 
Despite their endorsement of the President’s address, both the Post and the Times featured 
articles detailing various congressmen’s disproval. The Post quoted Senator Burton Wheeler, a 
Democrat from Montana and prominent isolationist, for example, who “agree[d] with what 
[Roosevelt] said about preserving democracy in this country and with what he said about 
Mussolini. I would have liked it better if he had added that he was going to keep this country out 
of war.”33 Such sentiment, coming from a fellow Democrat, emphasized how Roosevelt was 
going to have to tread carefully in the coming months, especially with the presidential election 
approaching on November 5, 1940. (Roosevelt’s campaign was already notable as he was the 
first president in history officially seeking a third term.)  
Other Democrats shared Senator Wheeler’s concern. Senator Adams of Colorado 
suggested a “wise corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine, that, for the participation of the rest of the 
world, “we should not interfere with the affairs of Europe.”34 Republicans expressed more 
outright concern. According to Representative Rogers of Massachusetts, quoted in the Post, “The 
                                                
31 “At Charlottesville,” The Washington Post, June 11, 1940.  
32 “Roosevelt Rips Italy; Pledges Help to Allies,” Chicago Tribune, June 11, 1940. 
33 “Indorsement, Concern Greet Roosevelt Talk,” Washington Post, June 11, 1940. 
34 “Indorsement,” The Washington Post. 
  15 
speech sounded to me like a declaration of war.”35 While these statements marked out the 
playing field for future political debate, the papers were also careful to emphasize the public’s 
support of Roosevelt’s statements. The New York Times quoted New York Democrat Sol Bloom, 
Chair of the House’s Foreign Affairs Committee as saying, “The President’s address proves 
conclusively that he had continued his efforts to bring about peace in the world, and I doubt if 
any Americans disapprove or disagree with any word he uttered.”36 
 
The President and the Press 
Roosevelt’s University of Virginia speech was unusual in that he had not floated a test 
balloon with the White House press corps beforehand to judge their reaction, though this was 
surely a result of the sudden nature of Italy’s attack on France. Although Early had alerted the 
press to the speech and seen to it that it was broadcast and well-covered, when the President 
began his press conference the next afternoon, he took not a little enjoyment at the reversal of the 
usual order of things: 
 The President: Plenty of news today all right. 
 
 Q: A lot of news from Charlottesville yesterday. 
 
 The President: Yes, I scooped you.37 
 
This colloquial exchange is indicative of Roosevelt’s relationship with the press. Part of 
Roosevelt’s success in ultimately convincing the press, and thereby the public, of the necessity of 
internationalism was his rapport with reporters. In a footnote to the collection of his public 
papers and addresses, Roosevelt himself wrote, “The great majority of newspaper correspondents 
                                                
35 “Indorsement,” Washington Post. 
36 “Congress Members Applaud the Speech,” New York Times, June 11, 1940. 
37 Press Conference #651, Executive Offices of the White House, June 11, 1940. 
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who cover the White House are personally friendly to the Administration.”38 Reporters echoed 
this sentiment; in 1938 the President of the National Press Club addressed Roosevelt, declaring, 
“Win, lose, or draw, in triumph or reversal, regardless of our personal opinions of your policies, 
we feel you have been a newspaperman’s President.”39 However to gain their editorial support, 
Roosevelt also had to be liked and agreed with by editors and publishers, who were not in the 
room with him twice a week and did not always subscribe to the President’s beliefs.  
Still the President endeavored to gain favorable coverage. The typical pattern between 
Roosevelt and the press during a press conference was that the President would mention various 
possibilities of what he might do in order, it seems, to see how the press would react, so the 
message he expressed at the University of Virginia speech came as a surprise. In his most recent 
press conference on June 8, the President had not made any mention of U.S. aid to the Allies at 
all, although there had been an extensive discussion of military preparations to defend America. 
The President had also said that he probably would not be able to get down to Charlottesville for 
the graduation.40 There is thus good reason to believe that Roosevelt’s speech was quickly 
generated, a direct response to Italy’s joining the Axis. In a quip to a reporter, Roosevelt showed 
that he had not fully thought out how his speech would change the country’s stance (or, at least, 
that he had not decided on a way to articulate it to the press): 
Q: Mr. President, would it be possible, in the light of present events, to use the term, “non-
belligerent” as applied to the United States, instead of the term “neutral?” 
 
 The President: John (Mr. O’Donnell), I haven’t had time since yesterday to open my thesaurus.41 
 
                                                
38 Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Volume Two, The Year of the 
Crisis: 1933 (New York: Random House, 1938), 38. 
39 Frank Luther Mott, American Journalism: A History of Newspapers in the United States Through 250 Years 1690-
1941 (New York: Macmillan, 1941), 724. 
40 Press Conference #650, Executive Offices of the White House, June 8, 1940. 
41 Press Conference #651, Executive Offices of the White House, June 11, 1940. 
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Roosevelt’s joke again shows the familiar way in which he addressed the press, but also how he 
used this style to avoid answering questions he was not yet prepared to answer. Roosevelt did not 
commit to deciding whether “non-belligerent” meant the same thing as the old label of neutrality, 
leaving open the possibility for a greater shift in policy to come in due course. As the summer of 
1940 progressed, Roosevelt kept moving carefully in this way, trying to gain acceptance from the 
press and by extension the public, to aid Great Britain.  
This process was far from simple. At Charlottesville, Roosevelt had enunciated a double-
pronged strategy: that the U.S. would aid Great Britain while securing resources to protect itself. 
Therefore, the President had to guard against any significant dilution of national strength in 
supporting Great Britain, a country then caught in the Battle of Britain, which many, including 
many Congressmen and the Ambassador to Great Britain Joseph Kennedy, considered a lost 
cause.42 Congress turned this view into law on June 28, when it forbade the sale of army and 
navy supplies unless service chiefs declared those supplies unessential to national defense.43 
 Understanding the public’s temperament, Roosevelt made little mention of his desire to 
provide the Allies with war supplies during the summer. But in an effort to educate public 
opinion towards his internationalist point of view, he spent a great deal of time taking reporters 
with him on his tours of naval facilities and frequently commented on the strength of the 
American military and the measures that were being taken to produce more airplanes and enlist 
more servicemen. The British press at this time was clamoring for support from America. 
Churchill told Roosevelt that the acquisition of even over-age American warships was “a matter 
of life or death” and King George VI also made a personal appeal to the President.44  
 
                                                
42 Dallek, American Foreign Policy, 243.  
43 Dallek, American Foreign Policy, 243. 
44 Dallek, American Foreign Policy, 243. 
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Destroyers for Bases 
Roosevelt was convinced by Churchill’s appeal and believed Great Britain could win the 
war, but there were legal and political constraints preventing him from making the bold 
internationalist move of giving Great Britain the American destroyers it would need to do so. 
Traditionally Congress’ approval would be needed for an international agreement of this kind. 
However, Churchill’s insistence persuaded Roosevelt of the situation’s urgency, and he began to 
look for a way around the constraints of his office. Prominent jurists persuaded Roosevelt that 
the Executive could act in this case without Congressional approval, and Roosevelt proceeded to 
make the deal with Churchill on August 13. In return, the U.S. secured leases on British naval 
and air bases, which held up the second prong of Roosevelt’s policy: to enhance the defense and 
security of the U.S.45 In lieu of gaining Congressional approval, Roosevelt told the press of his 
intentions. 46 He did not have (nor had he asked for) the consent of Congress, but the members of 
the press corps were also representatives of the people, and were also important to Roosevelt as a 
means of gauging the potential reaction of the public at large. Here the President created a new 
role for the press; they truly were the fourth estate, a group of political representatives with 
considerable influence. They did not always agree with him, but their value could not be 
discounted.  
Roosevelt brought up the matter of the destroyers in a very canny way. Talking about 
American generals visiting England, a subject tangentially related to the question of the 
destroyers, he remarked, “And somebody will ask me about the destroyers so you might just as 
well know now.”47 It was not certain that someone would actually have asked about the 
destroyers; the deal had not yet been announced and Roosevelt acknowledged that the American 
                                                
45 Dallek, American Foreign Policy, 245. 
46 Dallek, American Foreign Policy, 245. 
47 Press Conference #671, Executive Offices of the White House, August 16th, 1940. 
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generals visiting England had nothing to do with the destroyers, but he clearly wanted to get the 
story out so that he could gauge public reception: 
I am initiating, holding conversations with the British Government for the acquisition of Naval 
bases and Air bases for the defense of the Americas and particularly with relationship to the 
Panama Canal. If you want to put that in quotes, you can put it this way: that the United States 
Government is holding conversation with the Government of the British Empire in regard to the 
acquisition of Naval and Air Bases by the United States for American Hemisphere defense, with 
special reference to the Panama Canal – end of quote.48 
 
That the President directly delivered a quotation was significant. Roosevelt’s press conferences 
were usually off the record, a forum in which he could touch base with the press and they could 
understand the mood of the White House. The press conferences, unlike those conducted today, 
were not to generate specific quotes for news stories. The fact that the President allowed the 
press to quote this piece of information – and indeed had a quote at the ready – was a cue to 
reporters that he wanted this story to break. 
Roosevelt also tried to control the angle that the press would take on the story; he 
emphasized that “It is not a matter of destroyers,” but of America obtaining naval and air bases 
that could serve national defense. Or, in his own words, “the emphasis is on the acquisition of the 
bases – that is the main point – for the protection of this Hemisphere.”49 Such directing of 
attention was a political strategy. By August 1940 Roosevelt was the Democratic candidate for 
the presidency, running for his third term against Republican Wendell Willkie, a moderate 
Republican who went back and forth on the question of isolationism versus internationalism. In 
this context Roosevelt sought to control the press reaction and attempted to exercise a degree of 
control: He refused to answer many questions, repeating “I cannot give you any more 
information than I have given you here,” and, when posed with ‘what if’ questions by reporters, 
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he cautioned them against “do[ing] any assuming.”50 At the time of the press conference in 
question Roosevelt did not yet have official legal sanction for the deal from either the Attorney 
General or the Chief of Naval Operations.51 Given the agreement’s political sensitivity, 
Roosevelt could not risk any reporters embroidering his policy, and jeopardizing the approval of 
these critical backers. He therefore limited himself to just the facts and forestalled undue 
interpretations.  
Roosevelt’s tactic worked; the press did what he implicitly asked of it. Both the 
Washington Post and the New York Times ran cover stories about Roosevelt’s announcement. 
The Chicago Tribune’s lead story, on the other hand, was about Wendell Willkie accepting the 
Republican nomination for President in Elwood, Indiana. The Times acknowledged the unique 
way in which the President had disclosed the information. This was, according to Graham J. 
White, normal for the Times, whose reports, as opposed to those of the Post, “not infrequently 
went beyond a straightforward narrative of presidential announcements […] to descriptions of 
the atmosphere of the press conferences and to observations derived inferentially from the 
President’s answers or refusals to answer.”52 On this occasion the New York Times claimed,  
This announcement, first made verbally at [Roosevelt’s] press conference and then authorized for  
 direct quotation, led to the opinion among some observers, based on normal practice, that the 
 negotiations would not have been revealed at all if some basis for concluding arrangements had 
 not been found.53  
 
By referring to the observers present in the room, and how the President’s announcement 
differed from his usual practice, the Times emphasized how imminent the deal seemed to be. 
And in fact it was – Roosevelt had agreed to give Great Britain the destroyers on August 13.  
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However, in his press conference, Roosevelt had tried very hard to downplay any such 
assumption. He stressed to the members of the press present that it was not about the destroyers, 
although there would be a quid pro quo for the use of the British bases, the President did  “not 
know what the quid pro quo is going to be.”54 Though this was disingenuous because on August 
13 Roosevelt and Churchill had decided that the swap would be of American destroyers for 
British bases (and in fact, Great Britain’s need for destroyers had prompted the deal in the first 
place), Roosevelt maintained to the press that the bases were the important part, and he was 
unsure of the details of the U.S.’s side of the agreement. This did not stop the papers from 
speculating. The Tribune quoted Democratic Senator Claude Pepper of Florida saying, 
“destroyers would constitute at least part of the concessions made by the United States.”55 The 
Times reported that Roosevelt had communicated directly with British Prime Minister Churchill, 
sometimes by telephone, and that “it appeared to some observers that what may be in the offing 
is an executive agreement or a series of them which would not require Congressional 
approval.”56 The Washington Post reached out to British sources, but they backed up the 
President’s story:  
In London the United Press quoted authoritative British sources as saying that Prime Minister 
Winston Churchill had formally offered the United States 99-year leases on all British islands 
between Newfoundland and Guiana for use as bases. These sources the United Press said, declared 
there is no question of selling the islands and that the discussion of the island bases was not linked 
with proposals that the United States transfer destroyers to Great Britain.57  
 
Since Great Britain was at war, its press was being censored. Although there were 
internal debates within the administration about censoring the press earlier, Roosevelt did not 
impose any censorship upon the media until America entered WWII at the end of 1941.58 In 
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hindsight even writing that the President had cautioned reporters not to link the destroyers to the 
bases while at the same time the United Press stressed the lack of connection between the two 
seems to imply that the two would in fact be linked in a soon-to-be passed agreement. However, 
the effort that was taken to downplay this connection underlined the delicacy of the situation. 
 The situation was especially delicate because of the executive power the President was 
assuming. This was where the Tribune focused its coverage. The paper reported that, although 
Attorney General Robert H. Jackson was in the process of writing a certification that would 
make it lawful for the U.S. to sell destroyers to Great Britain pending approval from the Chief of 
Naval Operations, such a document would not comply with previous legislation, especially the 
recently renewed Espionage Act of 1917. The Tribune then quoted Senator David Walsh, a 
Democrat from Massachusetts, calling the proposed deal “an act of belligerency and war.”59 The 
Tribune made many of its attacks against the President in this language, and after he won re-
election the dictator accusations only increased (the paper called Lend-Lease the “Dictator Bill” 
from its inception until its passage). Facing accusations such as these, Roosevelt’s interactions 
with the press were all the more important. By seeking out the public’s weekly response to his 
actions, the President was able to show his democratic intentions to represent the people. 
 
A Done Deal 
Still, once the President had obtained adequate public support for a policy, he often 
disregarded the press. On September 3, 1940, Roosevelt officially announced the Destroyers for 
Bases agreement to the press on board his train to Washington. Although he had alluded to the 
idea weeks before, this announcement took place only 22 minutes before Roosevelt was set to 
deliver his message to Congress. He said he was sharing the story with the press because “you 
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ought to know about it because it will probably get all kinds of flashes, ‘For God’s sake, to get 
some news.’ Well, there isn’t any news.”60 What Roosevelt meant by this is that he was not 
going to share any of his opinions beyond the facts of the story. And he did not. He read his 
message to Congress and then fended off questions. When a reporter asked the difference 
between the status of two bases – one was a gift, while the other was leased – he refused to 
explain it, saying that it involved “Oh, all kinds of things that nobody here would understand, so 
I won’t mention them. It is a fait accompli; it is done this way.”61 This response is striking. 
While Roosevelt treated the press as a de facto Congress just weeks prior, once the deal was 
sealed, he responded to questions with elitism, the implicit message being “It is done this way” 
whether you like it or not. Richard W. Steele argues that Roosevelt was so tight-lipped during 
this press conference to avoid saying anything that could be used against him by newspaper 
reporters – that he was being defensive, not just suddenly discounting the press’ importance.62 
This is true to some extent – Roosevelt repeated the phrase “I don’t know” three times during the 
press conference, and refused to answer “if” questions yet again, this time defining an “if” 
question as any that went beyond the text of the statement. But the President did stray from his 
prepared statement to discuss his feelings about the agreement finally being passed. 
Roosevelt made it clear to the press that the Destroyers for Bases agreement was not only 
very important, but that he was very happy about it. Before reading the text of his statement to 
Congress he told the press that the agreement was “probably the most important thing that has 
come for American defense since the Louisiana Purchase.”63 (He then joked with a reporter that 
the Louisiana Purchase was before both of their time.) Tying the agreement to a previous event 
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in American history was a means of underlining its historic importance, but also of making it 
sound less drastic. Roosevelt gave a long, winding talk about Napoleon and Jefferson regarding 
the Louisiana Purchase to emphasize that previous political leaders of different countries had 
worked together to ensure national defense earlier in American history. Roosevelt also 
foregrounded the moral aspect of the agreement, in that it was the right thing to do, not just the 
militarily advantageous course of action. When a reporter asked him how much the destroyers 
were worth, he responded: 
You are thinking in terms of dollars and cents and pounds and shillings  and pence and you should, 
in a great emergency, remove pure figures from your mind. Some people will say, undoubtedly – 
this is still off the record that, from the point of view of dollars and cents, it is not a good idea. 
And others will say, ‘My God, that old Dutchman and Scotchman in the White House has made a 
damn good trade.’ Personally, you can take your money and take your choice. Personally, I think 
it is a damned good trade.64 
 
It is significant that this statement was not on the record. Roosevelt thus made the press privy to 
his private, privileged thinking. Isolationists would go on to make a case against this deal on the 
basis of cost. Roosevelt knew this argument – as well as the argument that the deal was a step 
towards war – would be the major one made against him. Still Roosevelt made clear to the press 
that he thought this argument a weak one. In this case, the morality of the agreement took 
precedence over its monetary value. But even more than enhancing American security or aiding 
Great Britain, Warren F. Kimball has argued that the swap of destroyers for bases was “a major 
psychological step in getting the United States and Great Britain ‘all mixed up together’ in the 
public (and congressional) mind.”65 The extensive press coverage of the agreement was the 
method by which this psychological step was taken. 
 Press reaction was mixed, and articles which praised the deal largely did so on the basis 
of its benefits to American security, rather than the morality of helping the British that Roosevelt 
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himself had stressed. The Chicago Tribune’s coverage is a good example of this divided 
response. On the one hand, the paper praised the deal, saying “Any arrangement which gives the 
United States naval and air bases in regions which must be brought within the American defense 
zone is to be accepted as a triumph.” However, the editorial followed this sentiment with the 
warning that “the compensation it must be admitted, is a dangerous one.”66  
The New York Times included a round up of editorials regarding Destroyers for Bases 
from papers across the nation, displaying the mixed reaction. One of the strongest voices against 
the agreement, the St. Louis Post Dispatch, outright condemned the action, with the sub-headline 
“Dictator Roosevelt Commits an Act of War.”67 First, the Post-Dispatch argued that Roosevelt 
was a dictator because he had acted unilaterally without consulting Congress. Roosevelt’s 
challenger for the presidency, Wendell Willkie, had the same problem. Although he supported 
the agreement, declaring that “the country will undoubtedly approve the program to add to our 
naval and air bases and assistance given to Great Britain,” Willkie declared it “regrettable, 
however, that the President did not deem it necessary in connection with this proposal, to secure 
the approval of Congress or permit public discussion prior to adoption.”68 It is true that 
Roosevelt had not consulted Congress, and when he mentioned the agreement to the press 
several weeks earlier in that rare on the record comment, he heavily managed the press, refusing 
to answer many of their questions and refraining from including that the U.S. would be giving 
Great Britain destroyers in exchange for naval and air bases. However the papers that ran stories 
about Roosevelt’s hints towards an agreement between the two countries enjoyed high 
readerships and were the principal papers that aroused public debate.  
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The Post-Dispatch article raised a second complaint to Roosevelt’s action: that it was 
tantamount to an act of war. Others did not deny that this might be a possible result of the action 
– Hitler might interpret America’s support of Great Britain as akin to the declaration of an 
alliance and in turn declare war on the U.S. as well, and, in that event, the country might need all 
the destroyers it had. The New York Times was careful to point out that the fifty destroyers had 
“been certified by Admiral Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, as not essential to the 
defense of the United States.”69 The Washington Post’s editorial used the reference Roosevelt 
had made to Jefferson and Napoleon to justify the action:  
Not since the days of Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe has the United States faced greater peril 
outside our own borders. Now as during the period of the Napoleonic Wars and the Holy Alliance 
the situation calls for bold and courageous action. It is to President Roosevelt’s credit that he has 
seen fit to take such action.70  
 
While the Washington Post acknowledged that it was wartime and Roosevelt’s actions could be 
seen as provocative, it also stressed that Roosevelt was rising to the level of his historical 
forefathers, intimating that he would make a strong wartime President. 
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Chapter 2: September-December 1940 
In an election year the Washington Post’s praise of the President’s step towards 
internationalism was especially important. And it was not the only such endorsement the 
President received. A Gallup poll conducted on September 4, 1940 – the day after Destroyers for 
Bases was announced – showed that if Great Britain was defeated and the U.S. would have to 
fight Germany alone, 58 percent of respondents preferred President Roosevelt as their 
commander in chief to Willkie. But if the election were held that day, with Great Britain still 
fighting and America not in the war, only 51 percent preferred Roosevelt.71 There is not a huge 
difference between these two figures, but it may have been significant enough to decide the 
election. Regardless, Roosevelt was already crafting for himself the image of wartime President 
– a year before the country would actually enter the war. While this image would make it 
possible for Roosevelt to continue to increase support for the Allied war effort, which would 
culminate in Lend-Lease at the beginning of his third term, he still worried that this might prove 
a handicap during the election. Despite the support that the Destroyers for Bases agreement 
generated, Roosevelt recognized this was largely due to the benefits the U.S. gained from it. 
With the great majority of Americans still opposed to direct involvement in the war, Roosevelt 
believed that the Republicans might effectively exploit this sentiment to unite the country against 
him.72 He therefore downplayed the importance of aid to the Allies during his press conferences 
between September, when the agreement was signed, and the election in November.  
During this period the Battle of Britain continued and Hitler extended his control into 
Romania and Italy and invaded Greece. The understandably preoccupied President spent most of 
his time in the White House unable to head off on official campaign travel. When he did venture 
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out, it was on what he called “inspection trips,” by which he meant tours of military plants. He 
brought reporters with him on these trips, emphasizing to the press how he was helping bolster 
America’s security. On September 20 1940 for example Roosevelt took reporters with him to the 
Philadelphia Naval Yard – where some of the 50 destroyers sent to Great Britain had been 
restored – and touted the success of the site: 
Q: Are you pleased with the progress you have seen here? 
 
The President: Very much. This whole thing is a very amazing illustration of what has been done 
in the Navy Yards. One of the interesting things is that we are stepping up on our time – the time 
of construction is a great deal less than it was a year ago. We are learning the art of speed in 
emergency.73 
 
Roosevelt similarly emphasized the advances made at the Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Fort 
Meade, and Watervliet Arsenal.74 Bringing the press along on these trips was intended to 
underscore Roosevelt’s strengths as a military leader, but while the country was learning the art 
of speed and efficiency in an emergency under his leadership, Roosevelt himself was losing 
speed in the press as a candidate for re-election. This of course was a campaign strategy of its 
own. By delivering phrases like “speed in emergency” to the press, Roosevelt was emphasizing 
that war could come any day, and that if it did, he was the one who would be prepared to handle 
it. 
 
Losing Press Support 
 Still Roosevelt lost press support because of the combined fear of American involvement 
in the European war and his unconventional bid for what some called a dictatorial third term. 
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Former election supporters such as the New York Times, Henry Luce of Time and Life 
magazines, Joe Patterson of the New York Daily News, and Roy Howard of the Scripps-Howard 
newspaper chain all came out for Wendell Willkie.75 Still, Roosevelt met accusatory comments 
from reporters at his press conferences with sarcasm; on October 15 for example, one reporter 
asked him his comments on some of the conservative opinions against him: 
Q: Mr. President, here is one that may be a little long: On your forthcoming political speeches, do 
you intend to answer charges made by your political opposition that you are seeking to become a 
dictator, and that there will be nothing to prevent you, or others after you, from seeking additional 
terms of office if you are elected to a third term? 
 
 The President: That is interesting; it has everything except the kitchen stove in it. Who wrote it? 
 
 Q: I did. 
 
 The President: Good boy! My congratulations to you! 
 
 Q: Is there an answer? 
 
 The President: My congratulations to you; it is beautifully worded!76 
 
Roosevelt responded here both evasively and mockingly, still ahead in the polls while his 
opponent Willkie shared much the same opinions on the war issue as he did. Willkie’s chance for 
success might have come had he took the opposite stance from the President regarding aid for 
Great Britain and improving America’s national security, but Willkie did not do so. 
Towards the end of the campaign, however, Willkie did try to distance himself from 
Roosevelt by claiming that he supported measures necessary only for defense, whereas the 
President, if re-elected, had every intention of taking the country into war. Roosevelt responded 
in a speech in Boston on October 30, 1940, just days before the election, “I have said this before, 
but I shall say it again and again. You boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars.”77 
David F. Schmitz has argued that the President dropped his usual qualifier – “except in the case 
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of attack” – here so as not to lead people to believe Willkie was correct so close to the election.78 
But it was the nation’s confidence in Roosevelt’s ability to handle the possibility of war that won 
him the election. He secured a demonstrative victory, although lower than either of his first two 
elections – 55% of the popular vote and 38 of the 48 states, or 499 electoral votes to Willkie’s 
82.79  
Although Roosevelt was elected with a large popular mandate he did so with the editorial 
support of less than 23 percent of the daily press. But his public support did not lead him to 
discount the importance of the press. Armed with four more years in office, Roosevelt could 
have shrugged off accusations that he was behaving dictatorially and pushed forward with his 
agenda regardless of public response. However, the President did not do so. He continued to 
engage with the press as a means to promote his internationalist agenda and gauge public opinion 
in response to it. Even when editorials were negative, Roosevelt’s frequent press conferences all 
served to get his arguments out to the people, while making sure that the debate between 
internationalism and isolationism continued throughout the country at large.  
 
The Question of Presidential Power 
It was not just the press that was thinking about dictators, but Roosevelt saw himself as a 
democratic leader, and his electoral victory as serving the salvation of American democracy. 
Although his challenger Willkie supported aid to the British, the President had worried that a 
Willkie win could have been interpreted as a victory for the isolationist, pro-appeasement forces 
in the country. Describing what this possibility could have meant for the future of the U.S., 
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Roosevelt remarked privately on election night, “We seem to have averted a putsch.”80 This 
reference to Nazi Germany indicates that the President was thinking about the more dictatorial 
forms of government that had arisen abroad, and decisively saw himself and his party in 
contradistinction to those developments. The press too underlined what the election meant for the 
U.S. in light of foreign affairs. After not supporting Roosevelt’s candidacy, the Times’ editorial 
was neutral towards the President’s re-election. The paper offered a general discussion of what 
Roosevelt’s third term meant for the country. The paper noted that everything about the 
President’s campaign had been geared to the conflict abroad and had emphasized his foreign 
policy experience:  
Everything was pitched on foreign policy and the mass benefits conferred by the New Deal, and 
this, plus the personality of Mr. Roosevelt, was successful in making the President the first Chief 
Executive in history to whom the two term limitation was not applied.81 
 
The Chicago Tribune took issue with the appeal of what the Times called the “personality 
of Mr. Roosevelt.” In an editorial two days after the election, the Tribune argued that the 
President’s sweeping margin in the Electoral College and his smaller, but still sizable lead in the 
popular vote did not connote a landslide but only sectional appeal. The paper stated, “WPA 
foremen alone in these states [with small margins of victory for the President] could have carried 
the election.” The Tribune’s editorial was decidedly unfavorable, targeting the power of the 
executive and the Democratic Party as unfairly having affected the results:  
Four years ago Mr. Roosevelt had a plurality of nearly 11 million in the country and he carried all 
but 2 states. That plurality compared with the one of Tuesday, without any deduction for the 
southern vote where it is virtually illegal to vote Republican, shows a shrinkage of 4,500,00 or 
thereabouts. That’s not a landslide. It is an election controlled by the influence of the party in 
power and the man in office.82 
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Walter Lippmann, writing in the Washington Post, also cautioned against reading too much into 
the mandate, albeit less critically:  
The initiative and the power to unite the nation or to divide it irreparably are placed by this 
election squarely, indisputably, upon Franklin D. Roosevelt. The responsibility is his and this is 
the mandate of the election, the only mandate which can be read into the returns.83  
 
Lippmann, like the Tribune editorialists, was referring here to the power of the President, but 
while the Tribune targeted the power of the office, Lippmann nodded towards the power of 
Roosevelt’s personality, not just his extended tenure in executive office. Each of the three 
newspapers emphasized that, rightly or wrongly, Roosevelt enjoyed a tremendous and unusual 
amount of power going into his third term. 
Roosevelt’s focus had never really shifted away from the question of aid to Great Britain. 
Even during the campaign he had been preoccupied by the foreign policy situation. With the 
campaign officially over, the full attention of the country also turned back to the overriding issue 
of the day: to what extent should the U.S. aid Great Britain. Hearing the news of the President’s 
re-election, Churchill wrote to Roosevelt:  
I prayed for your success and […] I am truly thankful for it. We are entering upon a somber phase 
of what must evidently be a protracted and broadening war […] Things are afoot which will be 
remembered as long as the English language is spoken in any quarter of the globe.84  
 
Understanding the severity of the situation, Roosevelt now gave more direct expression to his 
goal of aiding the British in the days immediately following his election. In his November 8, 
1940 press conference he spoke about allocating Great Britain half of all newly produced 
munitions.85 At first he dealt with questions about the Defense Commission very practically, but 
one question hinted at Roosevelt’s perspective on aiding the British: 
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Q: Mr. President, in dealing with this request of 12,000 planes, you said the Defense Commission 
had been asked to give its sympathetic consideration. Has that sympathetic consideration resulted 
in a final decision? 
 
The President: Not yet; it is being studied.86  
 
Before the election, Roosevelt would have refuted the claim that he wanted the matter considered 
sympathetically – the adverb went beyond the simple facts of the story, which the President 
repeatedly told reporters to limit their coverage to. But after winning the election Roosevelt took 
no issue with this embellishment.  
 Although Roosevelt had won re-election, his road to American internationalism was still 
not unobstructed. There were still high-profile voices in his administration who disagreed with 
him, most notably the American Ambassador to Great Britain, Joseph Kennedy. Kennedy had 
been a supporter of Churchill’s appeasement-minded predecessor, Neville Chamberlain, and at 
the height of the London Blitz in October 1940 had returned home to the U.S. for good, declaring 
that “England is gone” and “I’m for appeasement one thousand percent.”87 Back in the States, 
Kennedy went about articulating this conviction to the anti-Roosevelt, pro-appeasement press. 
Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes worried that Kennedy  
Had an interview with Hearst with a view to starting a campaign for appeasement, and has seen, or 
is about to see, Roy Howard [head of the Scripps-Howard newspaper chain] and Joe Patterson of 
the New York Daily News […] which has the greatest circulation of any newspaper in the 
country.88  
 
He also speculated that the Chicago Tribune and Washington Times-Herald would go along.  
Roosevelt invited Kennedy to Hyde Park to discuss the issue but the meeting did not go 
well. Roosevelt told Eleanor “I never want to see that son of a bitch again as long as I live. Take 
his resignation and get him out of here!”89 (The President later asked Kennedy to perform 
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ambassadorial functions until a new ambassador could be named.) Kennedy, meanwhile, told the 
press that his plans for the future would be to “devote my efforts to what seems to me the 
greatest cause in the world […] That cause is to help the President keep the United States out of 
war.”90 Kennedy turned out to be much less of a threat to his foreign policy than Roosevelt 
feared, and his successor, John Gilbert Winant, was one of the greatest advocates of American 
support for the British. But the amount of attention the President paid to Kennedy’s articulation 
of his pro-appeasement views to the press while still affiliated with the administration shows the 
issue of power from the other side: Kennedy wielded a considerable amount of political clout 
due to his prestige. But it equally shows how importantly Roosevelt viewed press support for his 
foreign policy agenda. 
By the end of November another sensitive issue had arisen: the question of money in 
relation to America’s aid to Great Britain. On November 23, Lord Lothian, the British 
ambassador to America, told a group of U.S. reporters upon his arrival at New York’s LaGuardia 
Airport, “Well boys, Great Britain’s broke, it’s your money we want.”91 These blunt remarks 
exploded across newspaper headlines.92 The headlines shocked the American public, who did not 
know Great Britain’s financial plight was so dire. Roosevelt had been aware of Great Britain’s 
financial predicament, even if he did not believe it to be quite as bad as it was, but now he 
worried that Lothian’s statement would give congressional isolationists ammunition to destroy 
the aid program, especially as Roosevelt was already facing legal difficulties in his desire to 
transfer war material to the British.93 The Neutrality Act forbade the sale of U.S. arms to any 
                                                
90 Michael Beschloss, Kennedy and Roosevelt: The Uneasy Alliance. (New York: HarperCollins, 1987), 230. 
91 Dallek, American Foreign Policy, 252. 
92 The New York Times’s headline read “British Funds Low, Lothian Says Here.” The Washington Post’s read 
“Great Britain Near End of Finances, Needs U.S. Aid, Lothian Says,” and the Chicago Tribune used the 
ambassador’s direct phrase in its headline: “Envoy Lothian Claims Great Britain Is Going Broke.” 
93 Davis, War President, 63. 
  35 
country at war. While this law was amended in 1939 when Germany invaded Poland to allow the 
sale of armaments for cash as long as the recipient country also paid to transport the material in 
their own ships (known as “Cash and Carry”), it still barred loans and required immediate cash 
payment for all munitions sold to a belligerent.94  
In a meeting with Lothian, Roosevelt told the ambassador that his request for financial 
help was premature and would remain so until the American public was thoroughly convinced 
that the British had liquidated their assets in the Western Hemisphere. At his press conference 
immediately following their conversation the question of Great Britain’s financial situation came 
up: 
Question: Mr. President, did the British Ambassador present any specific requests for additional 
help? 
 
The President: I am sorry, I shall have to disappoint quite a number of papers, nothing was 
mentioned in that regard at all, not one single thing – ships or sealing wax or anything else.95 
 
Roosevelt’s complete denial here is significant. The President did not want to start American 
financial aid to Great Britain before he was sure it was not only necessary but acceptable. More 
importantly he did not want to have to deal with the fears of isolationists responding to quotes in 
newspapers about the possibility of his increasing American aid before he was ready to. This 
speaks directly to the power the press had in the debate between isolationism and 
internationalism, which would only grow as the debate intensified. 
 
The Beginning of Lend-Lease 
What readied Roosevelt for a new plan to aid Great Britain was a more formal action, 
compared to Lothian’s blunt remarks outside the airport. On December 8, Churchill sent 
Roosevelt a letter he called “one of the most important I ever wrote,” which described Great 
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Britain’s prospects for 1941. He outlined British shortages in weapons, ships, and planes, the 
devastating losses being suffered at sea, and the fast approaching exhaustion of British financial 
resources to purchase goods from the United States. Playing the moral card that Roosevelt had 
long employed with the American press, Churchill’s letter led Roosevelt to break the logjam:  
The moment approaches when we shall no longer be able to pay cash for shipping and other 
supplies. While we will do our utmost, and shrink from no proper sacrifice to make payments 
across the Exchange, I believe you will agree that it would be wrong in principle and mutually 
disadvantageous in effect, if at the height of this struggle, Great Britain were to be divested of all 
salable assets, so that after the victory was won with our blood, civilisation saved, and the time 
gained for the United States to be fully armed against all eventualities, we should stand stripped to 
the bone. Such a course would not be in the moral or the economic interests of either of our 
countries.96 
 
Two days after receiving Churchill’s letter, Roosevelt conceived Lend-Lease. It was an 
attempt to avoid direct loans, to entirely “get away from the dollar sign,” in Roosevelt’s words. 
He described the process of Lend-Lease to his Treasury Secretary, Henry Morgenthau: “[We 
will] say to England, we will give you the guns and ships that you need, provided that when the 
war is over you will return to us in kind the guns and ships that we have loaned to you.”97 This 
was a much bigger step than the Destroyers for Bases agreement had been. The U.S. would forgo 
receiving anything in return for the war material given to Great Britain until after the war. And 
the armaments to be given to Great Britain could not be explained away as old and unnecessary 
to U.S. defense, as had been the 50 World War I destroyers. Instead, the U.S. would be giving 
newly-made weapons, ships, and planes to the British. This would be “something brand new,” as 
Roosevelt described in his December 17 press conference.98 
Because Lend-Lease was going to involve significant changes to American laws, 
Roosevelt could not subvert Congress as he had with the Destroyers for Bases agreement.99 
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However, just as at the beginning of Destroyers for Bases, he first pitched the idea of Lend-Lease 
to the press during a routine press conference in order to gauge their response. Roosevelt began 
by stressing the benefits to America that would come from aiding Great Britain, just as he had 
stressed the naval and air bases the U.S. would gain in the exchange with the British in 
September: 
In the present world situation of course there is absolutely no doubt in the mind of a very 
overwhelming number of Americans that the best immediate defense of the United States is in the 
success of Great Britain in defending itself; and that, therefore, quite aside from our historic and 
current interest in the survival of democracy, in the world as a whole, it is equally important from 
a selfish point of view of American defense, that we should do everything to help the British 
Empire defend itself.100  
 
By emphasizing the benefits of aiding the British to American security Roosevelt hoped to quell 
any isolationist response, but he spent far less time attending to that possible reaction than he had 
in previous discussions of his desire to aid the British.  
Still, not wishing the idea to sound too much like a departure from present foreign policy, 
Roosevelt provided a folksy analogy of one neighbor lending another his garden hose to help put 
out a fire:  
Now what do I do? I don’t say to him before that operation, “Neighbor, my garden hose cost me 
$15, you have to pay me $15 for it.” What is the transaction that goes on? I don’t want $15 – I 
want my garden hose back after the fire is over.101 
 
Roosevelt wished to lend Great Britain munitions on the same principle understanding. The 
analogy he constructed was clearly included to give the press a simple way to explain the 
measure to the American people. And while the President emphasized that the legal questions of 
the arrangement had yet to be worked out, and that American arms production would have to 
increase both for national defense and to aid the British (in and of itself a measure of national 
defense) he maintained his line that this would not take the country into war. It was instead a 
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moral action, illustrated by a simple example, a framework for a moral economy of 
neighborliness.  
Q: The question I have is whether you think this takes us any more into the war than we are? 
 
The President: No, not a bit 
 
Q: Even though goods that we own are being used? 
 
The President: I don’t think you go into a war for legalistic reasons; in other words, we are doing 
all we can at the present time.102  
 
The President’s claim that countries do not go to war for “legalistic” reasons referred back to the 
moral language he used. Roosevelt did not want the press to focus on the legal details of aiding 
Great Britain – some of which had not yet been worked out – but on the moral imperative to help 
one’s neighbor instead. While the legal specifics of lending war ships might not cause a country 
to join a war, the moralistic sentiment behind that loan might very well. 
The Washington Post, the New York Times, and the Chicago Tribune all relayed 
Roosevelt’s message to their readers. The Times told the story directly, emphasizing how the 
President “put all accent on material instead of money” and promised not only “all out for Great 
Britain” but “aid for ourselves also.”103 The Post added embellishments more typical of the 
Times’ journalistic style, describing the President as “bronzed and confident after his fortnight’s 
Caribbean cruise,” but still dutifully retold “The Parable of the Fire Hose” and reiterated that the 
President did not believe that this aid would bring the country any closer to war.104 The Tribune 
was even fairly mild. While it did stress the extent of American support – the subheadline of the 
article was “Rent England Anything it Needs, Says President” – the piece included how the 
President expected America to benefit, and cited Roosevelt’s neighborly example.105  
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Beyond these articles the papers did not cover the President’s press conference 
announcement. None ran an editorial about the possibility of all aid to Great Britain short of war, 
not even the isolationist Tribune, and while the Times had two further short articles late in the 
paper about the issue – one a report from London on British support for the President’s plan; one 
a piece on Clare Boothe Luce’s support of the measure and the President – the newspaper 
response did not match the level of involvement the Roosevelt administration was devoting to 
the new plan. 
 
“The Great Arsenal of Democracy” 
Twelve days later, on December 29, 1940, Roosevelt used a Fireside Chat to encourage 
support for all aid short of war. In the twelve-day interim between his press conference and the 
chat, the administration had continued with preparations for Lend-Lease. Primary among these 
was a major change in defense planning; on December 20 Roosevelt created the Office of 
Production Management, which streamlined military and civilian production.106 The creation of 
the OPM showed that the President was serious enough about his plan to create the infrastructure 
to implement it. With some of the more practical matters now addressed, Roosevelt turned to his 
most direct and unmediated tool for reaching the people – the Fireside Chat, the first of his third 
term – and spoke to them directly. 
The President began by turning to history – the tactic he had used in announcing the 
Destroyers for Bases agreement to the press when he recalled the Louisiana Purchase – to 
emphasize the importance of the current crisis. He alluded first to eight years earlier, when he 
was preparing to give his Fireside Chat on the banking crisis, declaring, “We met the issue of 
1933 with courage and realism. We face this new crisis – this threat to the security of our nation 
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– with the same courage and realism.” Roosevelt then cast further back in history, stating, 
“Never before since Jamestown and Plymouth Rock has our American civilization been in such 
danger as now.”107 In earlier drafts the speech reached even further back into history, declaring 
the American people to be “the heir of twenty centuries of faith in the fatherhood of God and the 
brotherhood of man” while “this year for the first time in our history, that Christian civilization is 
in danger.”108 In choosing the arguably less dramatic parallel, the President actually more firmly 
rooted the crisis in the trajectory of American democracy, which would resonate more with 
contemporary listeners. 
With the gravity of the situation established, Roosevelt went on to declare what he 
believed the country should do. Freed from the constraints of the campaign and his reluctance to 
speak about anything but peace, Roosevelt directly addressed the 40 percent of the country who 
continued to think it more important to keep out of war than to aid England. He turned their 
argument on its head, arguing himself that aid to England was the way to stay out of war: 
I make the direct statement to the American people that there is far less chance of the United 
States getting into war, if we do all we can now to support the nations defending themselves 
against attack by the Axis than if we acquiesce in their defeat, submit tamely to an Axis victory, 
and wait our turn to be the object of attack in another war later on.  
 
If we are to be completely honest with ourselves, we must admit that there is risk in any course we 
may take. But I deeply believe that the great majority of our people agree that the course that I 
advocate involves the least risk now and the  greatest hope for world peace in the future.109  
 
Finally, Roosevelt turned to the need for increased defense production. After appealing to both 
labor and management, Roosevelt then appealed to his listeners as a whole:  
We must be the great arsenal of democracy. For us this is an emergency as serious as war itself. 
We must apply ourselves to our task with the same resolution, the same sense of urgency, the 
same sprit of patriotism and sacrifice as we would show were we at war.110 
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America Tunes In 
The speech was one of the most successful the President ever gave. An opinion poll 
showed that 80 percent of those who heard or read the talk expressed approval, with only 12 
percent opposed. Furthermore, 76 percent knew about the chat – the largest number ever 
recorded as being aware of a Roosevelt speech.111 Reporters tuned in in great numbers as well. 
The New York Times’ page one story declared that Roosevelt found “little opposition even 
among the isolationists,” and continued by saying:  
Some who commented regarded the speech as a virtual announcement that America was in the 
war, and must win it, and accordingly were apprehensive as to whether future developments might 
not push this country beyond the ‘short of war’ barrier which has been erected in front of all the 
Administration’s defense policies and assistance to Great Britain.112 
 
Among those apprehensive people the Times quoted were Senator Burton Wheeler of Montana, a 
significant isolationist politician, and Senator Arthur Kapper of Kansas. But even these Senators 
did not disagree with the speech entirely. Kapper conceded, “I do not think we need to get into 
the war, but I am in accord with the President’s ideas on the need for a strong defense 
program.”113  
The Times did include two pieces describing more vehement disagreement with the 
President’s Fireside Chat, but these were local in scope. The first was a piece on Verne Marshall, 
editor of the Iowa newspaper The Cedar Rapids Gazette and chairman of the two-week-old No 
Foreign War Committee calling for a “fight” by the United States to stay out of the European 
war. The second was about the American Student Union wiring the President to protest against 
any evasion of the 1934 Johnson Act by lending material or extending credit to England. (The 
Johnson Act prohibited foreign nations in default from marketing bonds in the U.S.) The students 
called the war “imperialistic” and remembering how Woodrow Wilson campaigned for his 
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second term in 1916 on the platform “He Kept Us Out of War” when the U.S. entered World 
War I in early 1917, declared, “You can’t pull a Wilson on us.”114  
Still, despite the diversity of opinion that existed within its pages, the Times had been 
completely won over by Roosevelt. Its editorial, “A Call to Action,” titled after a line from 
Roosevelt’s address, was so favorable it bordered on fawning compared to previous Times 
pieces. The paper praised the President for making “the sort of ‘fireside talk’ that only he can 
make,” and stating, “the overwhelming majority of the country will agree whole-heartedly with 
his central thesis.”115 The editorial concluded by stating that the time for questioning whether or 
not to aid Great Britain was over: 
By bluntly announcing that he regards the anti-aggression pact signed by Germany, Italy and 
Japan as directed specifically against the United States, the President has put all three countries on 
notice that he regards them as potential if not actual enemies. Such a notice will be futile unless it 
is supported by an unmistakable acceleration of our own defense program. This has now become 
the nation’s central task.116 
 
Both the President and the press had long regarded the nation’s central task to be that of deciding 
the question of isolationism versus internationalism. But in winning a third term the President 
moved beyond this question and started to act more assertively internationally, and in this 
editorial the Times moved into the particularities of an internationalist policy, rather than sticking 
to the question of whether it was the correct path or not.  
The Washington Post’s editorial also supported the President’s speech. It praised the 
President’s “exposition and declaration” and “plain language,” saying, “with more logic than has 
been used in previous utterances, [Roosevelt] outlined the role for which we have been cast by 
our fellow democracies, no less than by our own policy. That role is for us to be ‘the arsenal of 
                                                
114 “President Is Asked Not to Aid Great Britain,” New York Times, December 30, 1940. 
115 “A Call to Action,” New York Times, December 30, 1940. 
116 “Call to Action,” New York Times. 
  43 
democracy.’”117 The Post’s comment about the President being more logical than he had been 
previously was echoed by other papers: The New York Herald Tribune called the President’s 
address “one of the greatest efforts of his career […] superb in its directness, its realism, its 
courage and its purpose.”118 The papers that took issue with the speech did so not on its position, 
but with its details. Some wished for more specificity beyond Roosevelt’s call for more airplanes 
and more ships. Some also pointed out that while the President had spoken well, he had 
articulated no new policy. But these qualms were limited compared to the isolationist arguments 
of the past.  
Still, the Chicago Tribune did respond unfavorably, leveling general, sweeping criticism 
against the President’s address in its editorial:  
Now that the election is out of the way and the third term is about to begin the persons who are 
determined that America should make war and not keep the peace are turning on the heat. They 
have nothing to fear politically now. The only thing the people can do is to protest and most of 
them are far away from the Washington scene where the decision will be made. It may be assumed 
that Mr. Roosevelt will pay very little attention to any display of public opinion or sentiment 
which opposes his own intentions. In his own opinion, his own program, whatever it may develop 
into, was approved Nov. 5. For whatever he does he will say he has a mandate.119 
 
This critique spoke directly to the perceived threat of unchecked and expanded presidential 
power. Now that Roosevelt had nothing to fear politically, having secured four more years in 
office, the Tribune worried he would forgo public opinion entirely and simply follow his own 
agenda.  
 But delivering a Fireside Chat was the best way Roosevelt had of communicating directly 
with the people, and speaking to reporters twice a week during press conferences was the best 
means through which the President could gauge public opinion. After his re-election Roosevelt 
did not cease using either of these tools. If anything, he made better use of the press conferences 
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after his election than he had before. Roosevelt would need Congress’ approval of the Lend-
Lease bill and full authority to provide help to the British. He would pitch the idea during his 
State of the Union address at the beginning of 1941, but he told Treasury Secretary Morgenthau 
right from the beginning, “We don’t want to fool the public, we want to do this thing right out 
and out.”120 As the debate over Lend-Lease began in Congress, Roosevelt gleaned public opinion 
from reporters and worked to alter the bill according to public demand, crafting aid to Great 
Britain in tandem with the support of the American public.  
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Chapter 3: January-March 1941 
 
 
Bolstered by the largely positive response to his December 29 1940 Fireside Chat and the 
mandate he had received in the 1940 election, Roosevelt rapidly pushed forward with his plans 
for an expansion of the country’s international role. While Treasury officials were drafting a 
Lend-Lease bill, which would allow the President to lend arms at his discretion to any ally, 
Roosevelt used his State of the Union Address to Congress on January 6, 1941 to outline the 
details of his desired program. Roosevelt made the case that, “Today it is abundantly evident that 
American citizens everywhere are demanding and supporting speedy and complete action in 
recognition of obvious danger.”121 This broad-sweeping claim did precisely what the Times 
November 10 editorial had enjoined the President not to do; the editorial had urged that he 
recognize in the huge minority vote polled in the election by Willkie a sign of “healthy 
opposition to some of the methods and some of the objectives of the Administration.”122 The 
President still depended on public opinion to support his actions, but now he was taking a more 
proactive role in channeling public opinion, rather than letting it determine the limits of his 
policy. Roosevelt was now fully prepared, in fact eager, to answer questions and defend his 
views during press conferences when he previously had held back from doing so. As a result, the 
debate in Congress and in the press over Lend-Lease was vigorous until the Lend-Lease Act was 
passed, and brought an end to America’s isolationist position.  
Roosevelt’s public activism began with his State of the Union address. As he went 
forward with his objectives for Lend-Lease he described them in language that had previously 
proved popular. In his December 29 Fireside Chat he had declared that America must become 
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“the great arsenal of democracy.”123 In the State of the Union he returned to this theme: “Our 
most useful and immediate role is to act as an arsenal for [the allies] as well as for ourselves. 
They do not need man power, but they do need billions of dollars worth of the weapons of 
defense.”124 Roosevelt then took the money question off the table in favor of an argument similar 
to the one he had used to justify Destroyers for Bases:  
I recommend that we make it possible for those nations to continue to obtain war materials in the 
United States, fitting their orders into our own program. Nearly all their material would, if the time 
ever came, be useful for our own defense.125  
 
But instead of justifying internationalism in terms of what other countries could do for America, 
as he had in the lead-up to Destroyers for Bases, when he stressed the strategic importance of the 
British bases above all else, Roosevelt now emphasized all production as beneficial to American 
defense, regardless of which country ultimately obtained the material. 
Unlike previous announcements, in which there had been a delay between the 
announcement of a particular policy and its enactment – during which the press had been able to 
evaluate the President’s proposal – Lend-Lease went from speech to bill in just four days. There 
were three press conferences in this brief interim, one of which was specifically a budget 
conference; in fact, the President’s announcement at the State of the Union was not discussed 
beyond its budgetary ramifications. On January 10, 1941, the day after the President had asked 
Democratic leaders for a bill that would not limit either the amount or the kind of aid he could 
send, those leaders introduced just such a bill into Congress. Designated H.R. 1776 and entitled 
“An Act To Further Promote the Defense of the United States, and for Other Purposes,” the bill 
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authorized the President to transfer any material to any country, and to decide what kind of 
repayment should be considered satisfactory.126  
 
“Dictator Bill” or Necessary Authority? 
The press reacted strongly to the executive power granted by these provisions. The 
Chicago Tribune’s front page headline declared “Senators to Fight FDR Bill,” followed by a sub 
headline of “Scheme Called a Dictatorship and War Move.”127 (The Tribune would continue to 
call Lend-Lease the “Dictator Bill” through its passage.) In its editorial, the Tribune warned not 
against supporting Great Britain, but against granting Roosevelt that much power, claiming that 
in “this era of superstate and the submissive subject… American liberties are in greater danger 
from forces here than anywhere else.”128 The “era of superstate and submissive subject” could 
certainly apply to the threat of fascist governments abroad, but the Tribune did not consider these 
developments relevant to the situation at hand. The paper repeatedly claimed that Hitler did not 
pose a grave enough threat to America to necessitate the country aiding Great Britain in the war 
effort, but it was willing to compare Roosevelt to a dictatorial leader and a threat to America. 
The “superstate” the paper invoked was the American post-New Deal state; McCormick had 
half-heartedly supported Roosevelt before the bulk of his New Deal administrations were 
created. Once Roosevelt established the National Recovery Administration in 1933 however, 
Tribune coverage soured.  
The Times reported the story very differently. Its front page headline read “President 
Calls for Swift Action,” and included a reference to Roosevelt’s press conference before the 
measure was introduced in Congress, in which he himself had argued, “some one had to have 
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authority to act quickly in this world crisis.”129 The Times’ editorial agreed with Roosevelt’s 
starting claim from his State of the Union:  
An overwhelming majority of the American people are convinced that the success of Great Britain 
in this war is essential to the security of the United States. They intend that the material resources 
of this nation shall be made available to Great Britain promptly enough, and on a large enough 
scale, to turn the tide of battle. Every available test of American opinion demonstrates to the hilt 
the truth of those two fundamental propositions.130 
 
This marked a dramatic change from how the paper had been reporting just a few months earlier. 
The Times had, after all, supported Willkie in the 1940 election. And while the editorial went on 
to call attention to the same issues raised by the Tribune, the Times did not call this power 
dictatorial, brushing off any worry by stating, “Fortunately, the Administration is not committed 
to the details of this particular measure [i.e., giving the President undivided authority] by 
anything more than time required for its preparation.”131 The Times raised practical concerns 
about the policy rather than any issues of principle relating to the President’s position. And 
Roosevelt, eminently pragmatic, responded to those concerns and accepted several amendments 
to the bill before signing it into law.132  
The Times closed by making its most important point, the one that showed the evolution 
of ideas over the last six months: “Fortunately too, there’s a wide area of agreement in Congress 
on the fundamental issue, and every evidence of a desire to face the question promptly and 
realistically.”133 In the Times’ take, it was not a question of whether Lend-Lease would pass, but 
when. In counterpoint to the Tribune’s headline about senators opposing the bill, the Times 
included a piece in which the two Democratic majority leaders – Senator Alben W. Barkley and 
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Representative John McCormack – interpreted its provisions for providing aid to Great Britain. 
While both papers turned to partial representatives, their different ways of framing the 
congressional conflict over Lend-Lease set the stage for the debate that would ensue.  
In terms of press opinion the Tribune had more papers in its camp than the Times. In the 
Times roundup of press views 12 papers’ editorials were quoted; only four were supportive, 
while the other eight ranged from caution to sharp questioning.134 However the ground on which 
these papers criticized the bill was its sweeping executive power, rather than the fact that it 
would involve the country further in the war. The trajectory of the Times was therefore mostly 
representative of the press at large. 
 
The Two-Way Street 
While Congress debated Lend-Lease, the President did his best to privately direct 
administration strategy. He asked the Century Group to lobby for the measure, helped draft part 
of Secretary of State Cordell Hull’s testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and 
continued to argue for the bill in his twice-weekly press conferences.135 Previously the President 
had refused to answer speculative questions about his internationalist agenda. In January and 
February of 1941, while not exactly forthcoming with quotable details, Roosevelt responded 
more readily to reporters’ questioning. For example, in a January 21 press conference, a reporter 
asked him a question about the U.S. convoying ships delivering Lend-Lease goods to Great 
Britain – a heavily contested issue that was ultimately restricted in the final version of the bill. 
The President offered a forthright response: 
Question: Mr. President, in the consideration of the lend-lease bill on the Hill they are constantly 
referring to the possibility of convoying ships; is that likely in the near future. 
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The President: I think I said the other day I had never even considered it in any way at all, because 
– of course I will have to give you this off the record – I mean this can’t – it’s got to be – Oh, I 
suppose, background, as long as you don’t attribute it to anybody. 
 
Obviously, when a nation convoys ships, either its own flag or another flag, through a hostile 
zone, just on the doctrine of chance there is apt to be some shooting – pretty sure that there will be 
shooting – and shooting comes awfully close to war, doesn’t it? 
 
 Question: Yes, sir. 
 
The President: You can see that that is about the last thing we have in our minds. If we did 
anything, it might almost compel shooting to start.136  
 
This exchange is notable for two reasons. Firstly, Roosevelt stumbled over his words more than 
usual in his attempt to respond, perhaps because he was offering information that he was not 
used to supplying. This stumbling may well have been a deliberate device to build rapport, and 
inflect a message subtly. Even if he did not allow his position to be quoted directly, it still 
affected how the story was reported. Secondly, while the President mainly provided background 
to the issue rather than his opinion on it, he did make a very clear statement against convoying. 
By speaking to the press twice a week the President learned what was at stake and what he 
needed to do to make Lend Lease palatable to the public. The reporter who asked about the 
convoying of ships was asking a much more serious question about the possibility of political 
slippage into war. To a large extent this was why Lend-Lease was so hotly contested; it 
committed America to nations at war in a way many considered tantamount to entering the war.  
But as Roosevelt became more forthcoming, so did his opponents in the newspaper 
industry. McCormick testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee against Lend-
Lease on February 6. Despite his intense dislike of Roosevelt, McCormick stated that he was not 
there to comment on the presidential plan to aid Great Britain, but instead to refute what he 
called “hysterical reports” of an impending Nazi invasion of the Western Hemisphere.137 
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Attacking Lend-Lease supporters’ main argument that the best way to keep America at peace 
was to ensure that Great Britain did not fall to the Nazis, McCormick offered historical examples 
he claimed proved that Hitler would not be able to invade the Americas. Roosevelt – who 
similarly deployed historical examples in his arguments – disregarded McCormick’s influence. 
In the next day’s press conference, a reporter asked about the publisher’s testimony: 
Question: Mr. President, Colonel McCormick said before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
yesterday that the geographical and strategical position of the United States is such that any talk of 
foreign invasion was ridiculous;–  
 
 The President: I want to ask you one question back: Did he speak as an expert? (Laughter)138 
 
The President had been poking fun at McCormick in press conferences since he assumed office 
in 1933 so it is hard to say whether Roosevelt viewed McCormick’s testimony as an actual 
threat. 139 Since the 1936 election, when the Tribune abandoned impartiality and came out 
against the President in its coverage, the paper struggled to be viewed as an objective source 
where Roosevelt was concerned.140  
McCormick did not win many followers, as the House approved the bill on February 8 by 
a vote of 260 to 165.141 With safe majorities in both houses, Roosevelt had reason to be 
confident, yet he was still concerned his Senate opponents, whom the Tribune was quoting at 
every turn, might use a filibuster to delay enactment. The President responded directly to 
opposition in the Senate: When Senator Wheeler declared that Lend-Lease was “the New Deal’s 
triple A foreign policy; it will plow under every fourth American boy,” Roosevelt not only 
argued against Wheeler’s claims, which centered around the belief that Roosevelt would use the 
Navy for convoying, putting American sailors in great danger, but also called Wheeler’s remark 
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“the most untruthful […] dastardly, unpatriotic thing that has ever been said.”142 So much of 
Roosevelt’s engagement in this debate was through his language, which was quoted in the press 
or at least influenced coverage. When the President decided to employ heightened rhetoric, it 
was a signal that the stakes had been raised.  
Roosevelt had more techniques than rhetoric up his sleeve, however. He had appointed 
his former opponent, Republican Wendell Willkie, as a special emissary to Great Britain. This 
political maneuvering proved effective, for when Willkie returned from London on February 10, 
he went straight to the Hill, where he warned Republicans that unless they renounced 
isolationism, they might “never again hold the levers of power in America.”143 Willkie proved a 
more convincing speaker than McCormick, and his report helped shift the debate in Congress. 
Meanwhile, as plans for Lend-Lease developed, Roosevelt continued to be forthcoming 
in his press conferences. On February 18th he announced that Averell Harriman would go to 
Great Britain as defense expediter, to assist in the transfer of material under “the lend-spend, 
lend-lease – whatever you call it – bill” (Roosevelt was evidently feeling loose that afternoon; 
here the press conferences being off the record worked very much to his advantage, as such a 
quote could well have been ammunition for the President’s opponents.)144 Harriman would go on 
to become a trusted advisor of Churchill and help foster the connection between the British 
Prime Minister and the U.S. President. Roosevelt anticipated the questions that reporters would 
ask about Harriman’s appointment and instead of shrugging them off, showed he had prepared in 
advance to answer them. For instance, he shared that he came up with the title of Expediter 
because he knew the press would ask for one and had answers to their inevitable questions 
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regarding the permanence of Harriman’s position and how Lend-Lease contracts would be 
organized. Hence when a reporter did indeed ask the President a specific question about the 
repayment mechanism of Lend-Lease, Roosevelt responded directly: “I can tell you exactly what 
happened yesterday or the day before, when I was talking about this thing.”145  
The President went on to give a lengthy explanation of columns and categories, outlining 
the delivery and repayment scheme of Lend-Lease as it stood, and showing that he had thought 
through what goods the British needed first and most. By shining light on policy decisions that 
were usually made behind closed doors, the President could ensure that Lend-Lease was a real 
policy, not simply a cover to enter the war, and at the same time make certain that continued 
coverage of the proposed act would be featured in the papers. And because Roosevelt answered 
reporters’ questions, this coverage was all the more detailed. The Post and the Times recounted 
details the next day, not only about how Harriman had been named to go to Great Britain, but 
also how the President, wanting to aid the British as soon as he was able, had made lists of the 
materials both the U.S. and the British would need in order to increase production. This detailed 
coverage proved that when the President told his Treasury Secretary Morgenthau  “We don’t 
want to fool the public, we want to do this thing right out and out,” he meant it.146  
The Tribune carried a completely different set of stories, mostly focusing on the 
reasoning of those remaining Republican Senators who opposed the bill, but the paper also 
received a scolding letter to its editor that showed its critiques were losing their punch. The paper 
most likely printed the letter so that it might appear impartial. Entitled “Terror Stricken,” the 
letter was from a Republican mother who accused the paper’s anti-Roosevelt agenda outright: “I 
sometimes wonder if you are really for the United States of America or if you are doing your 
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best to tear this country apart, as France was torn apart and thrown to the Nazis.”147 The Tribune 
was still calling Lend-Lease the “Dictator Bill,” so the comparison to a Nazi agenda was heavily 
freighted. The woman continued:  
Mr. Roosevelt, I am sure, has this country and its welfare foremost in his mind. I don’t see how 
any one can be so blind as not to see that if England falls, and we have to fight along against the 
whole of Europe, then we would have these bombs falling in our own backyards. What good 
would our dollars do us then?148 
 
While one letter to the editor does not signal a change in public opinion as a whole, this 
woman’s letter is important for two reasons. Firstly, it strikes against the Tribune’s main 
argument that Colonel McCormick went down to Washington to argue. McCormick testified to 
the fact that there was no reason to connect Great Britain’s fall and the possibility of America 
being invaded, but this woman clearly believed that the latter would follow in the event of the 
former. Secondly, she wrote, “I don’t see how any one can be so blind.” The fact was that just a 
few months earlier people had been easily blinded to the importance of aiding Great Britain in 
the manner that Lend-Lease allowed. The shift in the opinion of the country stemmed from 
Roosevelt’s new pro-activism and heightened moral language, incited by increasingly desperate 
calls from Churchill.  
 
“Our President Is No Stronger and No More Powerful Than Our American Unity” 
After many rounds of debate and several amendments (none of which vitiated the bill’s 
central purpose) Lend-Lease became law on March 11 1941. The Senate voted for the bill 60 to 
31; the House approved the Senate’s revised version 317 to 71. Roosevelt signed the bill into law 
that afternoon.149 Dallek claims that the President could have been assured of Senate approval 
without the added amendments, which “he felt compelled to accept […] to assure the strong 
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votes he wished.”150 Kimball has argued that this shows Roosevelt’s desire for maximum public 
and Congressional support. He had just been elected to a four-year term, so his concern could 
hardly have been caused by a fear of defeat at the polls. Instead, Kimball concludes, “The only 
logical assumption is that the President was attempting to work within the democratic structure 
as fully as he could without endangering American national security.”151 In the face of 
complaints about his executive power, Roosevelt endeavored to show that the country’s 
democratic structure worked without him assuming unconstitutionally large levels of power. This 
explains, I would argue, why Roosevelt was so responsive to the press during the Lend-Lease 
debate. With internationalism and isolationism finally brought head-to-head in Congress, 
Roosevelt wanted internationalism to triumph decisively and that required both the 
understanding and support of the public.  
With the Lend-Lease victory in his pocket, it is striking that the President returned to his 
less responsive ways during press conferences. During the March 11 afternoon conference – 
twenty minutes after the President had signed the bill into law – he made a statement to the press 
outlining the first list of material that would go to Great Britain. But he then refused to answer 
questions about it: 
 Question: Mr. President, you said you had a total of the value; are you going to tell us what it is? 
 
 The President: No. 
 
 Question: Mr. President, is this a lending or a leasing procedure? 
 
 The President: I give it up; I’m not interested. 
 
 Question: Do you have a system of bookkeeping set up, Mr. President? 
  
 The President: What? 
 
 Question: Do you have a system of bookkeeping set up to keep account of all this? 
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 The President: I don’t know.152 
 
Roosevelt could have been keeping quiet for several reasons. Perhaps these questions did not 
have answers yet; perhaps he was keeping his options open by not committing to one answer, or 
perhaps now that the bill was law, he no longer had to worry about winning public support and 
therefore did not have to answer the press’ questions with the diligence that he had for the last 
two months. Regardless of the correct answer, now that Lend-Lease was law the President 
displayed a very different style in this press conference than he had just days before. 
The change in the relationship between the press and President went both ways. Now that 
Lend-Lease was law, the press did not need the President to answer its speculative questions: 
reporters could go to the books and draw their own conclusions. The Tribune reacted predictably 
enough; the front page headline read “Dictator Bill Signed” and its editorial page declared, “Save 
Our Republic.”153 However these radical headlines created a problem for the Tribune with its 
fellow Chicago papers. The Chicago Times, run by Emory Thomason, the former general 
manager of the Tribune, had always existed peaceably in the shadow of the Tribune. But 
following McCormick’s latest headline, the Times struck out, and cited German and Italian news 
reports containing praise for the Tribune and its stand against American warmongers.154 While 
Lend-Lease may not have convinced McCormick to change the editorial tone of his paper (in 
fact, the end of his friendship with Thomason led the Colonel closer to Charles Lindbergh, the 
leader of the isolationist America First party) it did create severe trouble for him in the 
newspaper industry. 155 
                                                
152 Press Conference #725, Executive Offices of the White House, March 11, 1941. 
153 “Dictator Bill Signed”; “Save Our Republic” Chicago Tribune, March 12, 1941. 
154 Smith, The Colonel, 404. 
155 Smith, The Colonel, 404. 
  57 
The Post and the Times, on the other hand, no longer needed to defend the bill now that it 
had been passed. Instead of editorials urging support for the measure, both papers simply 
covered its passage as a news story. The Post injected some opinion into one of its midsection 
reports: a page eight article began by declaring “Few more historic measures have been put on 
our statute books than the bill which the President signed yesterday” and ended by stating “Our 
President is no stronger and no more powerful than our American unity.”156 This last line 
countered any dictatorship claims. The paper argued that the President was at his most powerful 
when supported by Congress and the American people. The Times’ page one story similarly 
declared the bill “history-making.”157 The Times addressed the questions the President would not 
answer in his press conference:  
The President not only declined to reveal any of the items on the list of  immediately transferable 
materials, but would not disclose the dollar-value, although he said that a calculation had been 
made on the basis of original costs. He gave assurances that details would be revealed if and when 
publication of the information would be of no military value to other countries from those 
intended to be benefited.158 
 
But, as this passage shows, the paper was not criticizing the President for his reticence; indeed, 
the article went on to cite other sources and create a comprehensive report of Lend-Lease’s first 
hours. While the President had returned to his cagey responses, coverage did not stop. 
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Conclusion 
Four days after Lend-Lease was passed, Roosevelt spoke at the annual dinner of the 
White House Correspondents’ Association. It was the first such dinner at which he had made a 
speech, although he had attended the event for the last eight years. In his address, Roosevelt 
played the crowd, recognizing the important role the press played in his presidency and that it 
had played in the Lend-Lease debate in particular. It is true that the President may have been 
particularly generous in giving credit to the assembled newspapermen because, as he recognized 
early in his speech, his address that night “differ[ed] from the press conferences that you and I 
hold twice a week, for you cannot ask me any questions tonight; and everything that I have to 
say is word for word ‘on the record.’”159 But the speech, which mostly focused on American 
unity against the Axis powers, paid extra attention to the role of the press:  
For eight years you and I have been helping each other. I have been trying to keep you informed of 
the news in Washington, of the Nation, and of the world, from the point of view of the Presidency. 
You, more than you realize, have been giving me a great deal of information about what the 
people of this country are thinking and saying.160 
 
In outlining the two-way relationship between himself and the press, Roosevelt showed how, 
perhaps indirectly and unwittingly, the press showed him what needed to be done to secure 
passage of Lend-Lease. By revealing to the President “what the people of this country are 
thinking and saying,” the press played a crucial role in American democracy. Unlike dictators 
abroad, Roosevelt responded to public opinion and altered his rhetoric and policies in accordance 
with the people’s wishes.  
The President did so while still maintaining his pragmatism and characteristic 
evasiveness, shifting positions until he felt he had enough support. Roosevelt’s slow and careful 
effort to avoid controversial issues and questions he did not want to answer played a large role in 
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his press policy; it meant he needed the press for their insight into public opinion as much as 
reporters and publishers needed him in order to report the news. This partnership resulted in a 
democratic success – America’s newfound resolve to aid the Allies. Roosevelt declared: 
Let not the dictators of Europe or Asia doubt our unanimity now […] The world has been told that 
we, as a united Nation, realize the danger that confronts us—and that to meet that danger our 
democracy has gone into action.161  
 
These sentences were packed with significance. Roosevelt directly attacked dictators abroad, and 
by repeating how a united America was a “democracy gone into action” emphasized that he 
could not be counted among their number.  
However it had taken months for this unanimity to be reached; when the President first 
called for such action in his Charlottesville speech the previous June it had not materialized 
immediately. Roosevelt credited the press for the role it had played in transforming American 
public opinion over the interim months:  
We have just now engaged in a great debate. It was not limited to the halls of Congress. It was 
argued in every newspaper, on every wave length, over every cracker barrel in all the land; and it 
was finally settled and decided by the American people themselves.162  
 
American democracy had worked. Roosevelt made good on his rhetorical flourishes; he did not 
just preach a public policy of internationalism, but by encouraging debate he had made it a 
functioning reality. Roosevelt’s level of engagement with the press showed that he believed in 
the democratic process. The press, in its role as the fourth estate, proved to be a crucial element 
within it. As Walter Lippmann wrote in his 1920 article “Journalism and the Higher Law,” “the 
news is the chief source of the opinion by which government now proceeds.”163 
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